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I. INTRODUCTION
Few issues in America spark more robust debate and disagreement
than capital punishment. The theoretical foundations of the penal system in
this country (whether the role of the state towards criminals should be
predominantly one of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution) stand at the
1
forefront of the debate. The finality of the penalty provides the most
illustrative and arguably the most tragic examples of the insufficiencies of
2
the American criminal process. The death penalty, as “the ultimate act of
3
state,” provides a forum for very refined moral arguments centering on the
role of the state over those whom it governs. This list is certainly not meant
to be exhaustive, but merely indicative of the several issues and arguments
that often follow debates on capital punishment through the legislatures,
4
courts, and public forums of this country.
One issue that is often overlooked in the capital punishment debate is
the policy, adopted in some form by every criminal jurisdiction with the
death penalty, to shield the public from the specifics of the application,
administration, and resolution of the death sentence. Many Americans
place the fundamental theoretical concepts of the First Amendment at the
very cornerstone of the American democratic system. The First
Amendment secures “the paramount public interest in a free flow of
5
information to the people concerning public officials.” It “assures the
6
maintenance of our political system and an open society.” It is in stark
contrast to these principles that private execution laws in this country
prohibit the public from viewing, and in some cases even prohibit the press
from reporting, on the administration of capital punishment.
This Note provides a brief historical and analytical account of capital
punishment in this country. This discussion will highlight the legislation,
administrative policy, and penal rules that have historically restricted
access to the execution chamber for the express purpose of preventing the
dissemination of information regarding capital punishment to the American
voting public. Ultimately, this Note will argue that this historical backdrop
forces courts analyzing these laws to characterize these regulations as
content-based distinctions on free speech, rather than to grant the broad

1. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES v (Hugo Adam Bedau
ed., Oxford University Press, 1997).
2. See id.
3. Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F.Supp. 468, 471 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
4. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 1, at v.
5. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
6. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
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deference these regulations are typically given in the courts’ right-ofaccess jurisprudence.
Part II of this Note will provide a brief background of the methods of
capital punishment at the time of the country’s founding through the early
parts of the twentieth century. It will highlight trends in attitudes toward
capital punishment and discuss major attempts to humanize or to abolish
capital punishment. Part III will address the emergence of private execution
laws and argue that these laws arose in direct response to anti-death penalty
movements throughout the nineteenth century. Part IV will analyze the
Supreme Court’s freedom of the press jurisprudence, specifically focusing
on the “right of access” to government proceedings. This is the context
upon which challenges to private execution laws have historically been
brought. Part V will address the most recent manifestation of this
movement: attempts to broadcast executions to the general public. Part VI
will argue that these challenges have ultimately failed because of their
characterization as “access” cases. The historical tradition of shielding facts
about executions from the public necessitates that the courts evaluate these
cases under the Supreme Court’s holdings involving content-based
restrictions on speech.

II. THE HISTORICAL TRADITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES
A.

The Colonial Era

During the early Colonial period, all thirteen American colonies
7
imposed capital punishment for at least some crimes. The Colonial
punishment scheme was modeled heavily after the system in England;
8
however, the colonies imposed capital sentences for fewer crimes, and the
officials administering the trials were generally more hesitant to impose the
9
death sentence. New York’s capital scheme was fairly representative of the
colonies during the seventeenth century; the state imposed capital

7. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 1, at 4.
8. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2 (Bryan
Vila and Cynthia Morris eds., 1997).
9. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 17871975 xiii (Philip English Mackey ed., 1976). During the mid-seventeenth century, England
had fifty-five capital offenses, while the colonies generally had around a dozen. CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 2.
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sentences for eleven crimes. Pennsylvania and West Jersey were the most
lenient of the colonies, authorizing capital sentences only for treason or
11
murder. Generally, the Southern states’ capital laws imposed the death
12
sentence for a wide variety of offenses, especially for slaves.
Although harsh by today’s standards, the colonies’ capital laws were
13
much more lenient than those of England or of continental Europe.
Beginning around the turn of the eighteenth century, the colonies began to
14
enact stricter capital punishment laws. This trend is primarily attributed to
three factors: (1) population growth necessitated stricter criminal laws; (2)
the absence of a prison system made capital punishment an attractive and
economical alternative; and (3) the English Crown pressured Colonial
governments for stricter criminal laws, especially in regards to capital
15
sentences. By the Revolution, all thirteen American colonies prescribed
capital sentences, and all but Rhode Island imposed it for at least ten
16
separate offenses.
Prior to the American Revolution, the colonies applied the death
sentence in open forums that invited and encouraged public audiences, and
17
generally used hanging as the method. Philip English Mackey described a
common spectacle surrounding an eighteenth-century execution:
Felons were either hanged, often so clumsily that they died in slow
agony, or burned at the stake (a method usually reserved for blacks and
Indians). In either event, the execution took place in public, with
rowdy onlookers jockeying for the best view. In some cases, the
10. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xi. The capital offenses in New York’s Duke’s Laws of 1665 included:
[D]enial of the true God; premeditated murder, slaying someone who had no
weapon of defense, slaying by lying in wait or by poisoning; sodomy, buggery;
kidnapping; perjury in a capital trial; traitorous denial of the king’s rights or
raising arms to resist his authority; conspiracy to invade towns or forts in the
province; and striking one’s mother or father (but only upon complaint of both).
Id.
11. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xii.
12. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 8, at 2. “[T]he Slave Codes enacted during the 1660s included a long list of behaviors
that were considered crimes only if committed by blacks. Furthermore, slaves were
subjected to numerous capital laws that did not apply to the free population.” Id. (citation
omitted).
13. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xiii.
14. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 8, at 3.
15. Id.
16. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xii.
17. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 1, at 4.
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publicity of the punishment did not end with the criminal’s death. The
authorities sometimes ordered the corpse exhibited in a public place—
in rare instances for periods exceeding a year—for the edification of
18
potential wrongdoers.

B.

Initial Reforms: 1776-1800

The American Revolution did little, if anything, to change capital
19
punishment laws in this country. The initial spark for reevaluation came
not from war, but from philosophy. In 1763, the Italian jurist Cesare
Beccaria published his treatise Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crimes and
20
Punishments). Beccaria advocated for punishments that were proportional
21
to the crime. Furthermore, he argued that the barbaric nature of the death
22
sentence promoted crime, rather than serving as a deterrent. The book was
read extensively in Europe and the first English translation was available in
23
New York in 1773. Although initially, the work was not widely received
in this country, it did help spark the first political debate over the use of
24
capital punishment in the years following the Revolution.
Philadelphian Dr. Benjamin Rush was the first outspoken opponent of
25
capital punishment in this country. He published his treatise, An Enquiry
into the Effects of Public Punishments Upon Criminals and Upon Society,
26
in 1787. Rush argued that capital punishment violated both reason and
27
divine law, irrespective of the criminal offense. Due in no small part to
Rush, the initial battleground over capital punishment was the
Pennsylvania legislative chamber. In 1794, the state abolished capital
28
punishment for all crimes except first-degree murder. New York followed
18. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xii-xiii.
19. Id. at xiii-xiv.
20. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 1, at 4.
21. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 8, at 4.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
[D]ue to preoccupation with the Revolutionary War, it wasn’t until several years
later that Beccaria’s book had an impact in America. When it did, that impact was
significant. Their independence won, Americans were eager for political reform as
they shaped the new government and system of laws. And thus began the first real
debate over capital punishment in the United States.
Id. at 4-5.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 20.
27. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xv.
28. Id. at xv-xvi. The leader of this reform was the state’s attorney general, William
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with a major reform to its capital laws in 1796. Advocated by leaders such
as Thomas Eddy, Philip Schuyler, and Ambrose Spencer, New York
30
abolished capital sentences for all crimes except treason and murder. New
York, however, unlike Pennsylvania, did not separate murder into
31
degrees.

C.

The First Abolitionist Movement: 1800-1860

It is difficult to separate the movement against capital punishment in
the early nineteenth century from the broader Western Enlightenment
32
movement for prison reform. European philosophers such as Beccaria,
John Howard, and Jeremy Bentham were very successful in arguing for a
33
system of penal justice that emphasized reform. The most important
practical result of this movement was the development of penitentiaries.
These new prisons were meant to be schools of reform that offered
prisoners the opportunity to develop their character and rejoin society as
34
“reformed” citizens. “During the nineteenth century, the goals of
abolitionists were intertwined with those of prison reformers in part
because they tended to share a common view of humanity, but also because
effective reform of prisoners provided for both groups an attractive
35
alternative to execution.”
Although abolitionist thought grew out of a much larger movement
for penal reform, it remained a distinct and separate argument in this
country. While penal reform was driven by Enlightenment thinkers such as
Bentham and Beccaria, the abolitionist movement in this country was
36
fueled by “the tides of religious revival, social reform, and romanticism.”
37
Even as complaints against broad prison reform grew in number, the

Bradford. He did not push for complete abolition, wishing to see it retained for murder.
However, “he argued that capital punishment was useless in preventing some crimes. It was
worse than useless, in fact, because it sometimes made convictions harder to obtain. A
system of laws which encourages the acquittal of felons, Bradford reasoned, must be
altered.” Id.
29. Id. at xvi-xvii.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 8, at 31.
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 31.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 34-35.
37. Id. at 31-32 (“In 1817, authorities in Philadelphia and Massachusetts reported that
roughly a third of their current convicts had been released from the penitentiary system
previously.”).
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abolitionist movement continued to thrive, reaching its peak during the
38
1830s and 1840s.
During this period, the debate over capital punishment raged across
39
the American press. “Hundreds of books and pamphlets attacking the
40
death penalty” were published during the 1840s. William Cullen Bryan of
the New York Post and Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune were
41
perhaps the most influential abolitionist speakers. Numerous other
42
newspapers and periodicals devoted extensive space to the debate, while
two periodicals of the period were devoted exclusively to prison reform and
43
abolishing the death penalty.
In addition to the formal press, there were numerous private “anti44
gallows” organizations formed during the 1840s. By 1845, the New York
State Society, perhaps the most influential of the anti-gallows societies,
45
founded a national organization against capital punishment. The purpose
of the organization was to centralize the movements within the states, and
46
bring together a national campaign against capital punishment. In 1845,
death penalty opponents sponsored a convention in Philadelphia.
Abolitionists from across the country gathered, where among others, U.S.
47
Vice President George M. Dallas addressed the crowd. Prominent
politicians such as John Quincy Adams and Richard M. Johnson also
verbally committed to the reform movement; however, their direct
48
involvement was not particularly strong.
The abolitionists were not the only voices speaking on the issue of
capital punishment. The strongest supporters of the death penalty were
49
found in the Eastern religious establishment. George B. Cheever was the
most powerful of the death penalty advocates. Leading a small group of
powerful clergymen, he resisted the reformers in the press, in the state
38. Id. at 34-35.
39. Id. at 35.
40. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xxiv.
41. Id. at xxii.
42. Id. at xxiv.
43. Id. at xxiv-xxv. Charles Spear’s The Hangman and George Baker’s The Spirit of the
Age both dealt exclusively with the topic. Id.
44. Id. at xxv.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at xxii-xxiii.
49. Id. at xxiii (“Almost without exception, they were members of the orthodox
Calvinist clergy—especially Congregationalists and Presbyterians—those who might be
termed the religious establishment of nineteenth–century America.”).
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capitals, and in sermons. Cheever advocated for the retention of capital
punishment primarily upon the ground that to do otherwise would violate
51
divine law. He also defended the death penalty on the practical policy
grounds of its immense deterrence value and the retributive nature of a
52
death sentence attached to a serious criminal offense. One reformer of the
53
era proclaimed that “the Church of America alone upholds the Gallows.”
Although the debate surrounding capital punishment was strong, the
abolitionists failed to achieve any real success in the state legislative
54
chambers. Michigan was the only state to completely abolish capital
55
sentences, but this was primarily due to the fact that since statehood, it
56
had never used the death penalty, even though it was legal. The reformers
57
nearly achieved success in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts,
but ultimately the crimes for which capital punishment was imposed in
1850 were not significantly different than they had been twenty years
58
earlier when the movement caught fire.

D.

The Civil War and Beyond

The reform movement against capital punishment began to slow in
59
the 1850s. However, it did not stall as much as it evolved to face a
60
different issue: slavery. “[T]he campaign against capital punishment had
ground to a halt because, like most reformers, abolitionists had come to see
slavery as the greatest evil plaguing the land and their moral and political
61
energies were absorbed by the Civil War.”

50. Id. at xxiii.
51. Id. at xxiv.
52. Id. See also CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 8, at 54. In 1843, Cheever and John O’Sullivan held a series of public
debates regarding New York’s use of capital punishment. The debates helped to spark an
intense dialogue in the local newspapers in the following months. Id.
53. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xxiii.
54. Id. at xxv.
55. Id. at xxvi. Michigan completely abolished capital punishment in 1846. Id.
56. Id. (“[I]t was not necessary for reformers in Michigan to convince the legislature to
end executions, but only to bring the laws into conformity with established practice in the
state.”).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 8, at 35.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Capital punishment did not return to the forefront of political debate
62
in this country for several decades. The severity of the war, the increase in
social violence during Reconstruction, and the immigration wave of the late
nineteenth century all contributed to a continued policy of endorsement of
63
capital punishment.
This trend began to change slightly with the Progressives of the early
twentieth century, although they were not as successful as their
64
predecessors had been nearly sixty years before. But eventually the
Progressive movement against capital punishment ultimately failed for the
same reasons as the initial abolitionist movement. “When America’s entry
into World War I fostered racism, nativism, suspicion, and fear that
provided fertile soil for retentionist arguments, the abolition movement
65
stalled out once again—as in the 1860s—a casualty of war.”
The history of capital punishment in this country certainly does not
end with the first World War. In the years following the Depression and
World War II, the fora for the death penalty debate shifted from the
66
legislative chambers to the federal courts. The purpose of this Note is to
analyze trends in popular opinion regarding capital punishment. Therefore,
the modern history of the political debate, with its emphasis on
constitutional principles and legal theories, has little relevance to
this argument.

III. PRIVATE EXECUTION LAWS: PATERNALISM AND SECRECY
As discussed infra, throughout the Colonial period and the initial
decades of the American republic, executions were conducted in public,
67
often in large fora that invited and encouraged attendance. By the 1820s
and 1830s public executions were a violent and commercially exploited
68
spectacle that often led to drunken riots.
While the abolitionist movement of the era was unsuccessful in
ending capital punishment, one practical result was the enactment of
69
“private” execution laws. Rhode Island became the first in 1833, followed

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 37.
65. Id.
66. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 1, at
11-16.
67. Supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
68. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xx.
69. Id.
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by Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. These laws
moved the gallows from the public squares or commons to walled
71
enclosures, or in some cases within penal institutions. By 1849, fifteen
72
states held their executions within prisons, shielded from public view.
It is easy to characterize the development of private executions as a
practical result of the prison reform movement. Private executions are
certainly a more humane punishment, but this would not be a historically
73
accurate account of the change. The push for private executions came
74
from the retentionists. Historians have argued that death penalty
supporters favored private execution laws out of a “fear that wellpublicized executions would fan sentiment to abolish capital punishment
75
altogether.” Justice Marshall alluded to this fact in his concurring opinion
in the landmark death penalty decision Furman v. Georgia: “[E]xecutions,
which had once been frequent public spectacles, became infrequent private
affairs. The manner of inflicting death changed, and the horrors of the
punishment were, therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of the
76
general public.”
77
Most abolitionists actually opposed private execution laws. Thomas
C. Upham, a leading abolitionist in Maine, wrote that:
The occasion [public execution] is generally made one of great riot,
noise, confusion, drunkenness, and every species of crime.—This is
universally admitted to be the case. So much so that some of the
United States have recently enacted, that executions shall not be
public. A great anomaly this in a republican government! Our courts of
justice must be open to the public; the deliberations of our legislatures

70. Id.
71. John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a First
Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 362 (1993).
72. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xx.
73. See Bessler, supra note 71, at 360-62.
During the 1830s, however, in response to a growing movement to abolish capital
punishment, several states began to prohibit public executions. In New York, in
1834, for example, an assemblyman, Carlos Emmons, introduced a bill to abolish
public executions. Initially, his idea met with bitter resistance from two groups.
One faction, viewing public executions positively, felt that the practice should be
continued. The other group, comprised of legislators who favored abolition of
capital punishment altogether, rejected Emmons’ proposal on Machiavellian
grounds.
Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 360-62.
75. Id. at 360 n.17 (quoting G. Mark Mamantov, Note, The Executioner’s Song: Is
There a Right to Listen?, 69 VA. L. REV. 373, 375 (1983)).
76. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 340 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
77. Id.
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must be public; not even a poor freemasonry society is to be tolerated,
because its ceremonies are secret; but when life is to be taken, when a
human being is to be smitten down like an ox, when a soul is to be
violently hurled into eternity, the most solemn occasion that can be
witnessed on earth, then the public must be excluded. . . . If business of
78
this nature is done at all, it must be done in the light of day . . . .

Public sentiment against the death penalty dropped dramatically after
the introduction of private execution schemes, and many abolitionists of the
time felt that their cause ultimately failed because executions were no
79
longer a public spectacle. Horace Greeley stated that the private execution
law in New York “subtracted much of the force” from the anti-gallows
80
movement in the state.
Thus, the abolitionist movement against capital punishment was
followed immediately by the reactionary movement to remove executions
from public view. While the precise motivations of the advocates and
legislators who enacted private execution schemes cannot be completely
uncovered, their effect is irrefutable. Following the enactment of private
execution schemes, the public debate surrounding capital punishment
declined greatly. This was certainly due in part to the emerging tension that
led to civil war; however, the historical evidence demonstrates that private
execution laws contributed significantly to a decline in public debate on a
core political issue.

IV. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
Many scholars and lawyers attempt to argue for a right of access to
the execution chamber for members of the media. While these specific
challenges are addressed in the next Section, it is useful to describe the
major holdings of the Supreme Court regarding access to the courtroom
and access to prisons.

A.

Access to Courtrooms

In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the press has a constitutional right of access to attend criminal
81
trials. More importantly, in his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger
held that the source of this right is not the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
a public trial, but rather the First Amendment. “We hold that the right to
78. THOMAS C. UPHAM, THE MANUAL OF PEACE (1836), reprinted in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 50-51.
79. VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 9, at xxi.
80. Id.
81. 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).
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attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the press could
82
be eviscerated.’” There are two aspects of the Chief Justice’s reasoning
which are relevant in the debate surrounding private execution laws. The
Court based much of its holding first on the historical openness of
83
courtrooms, both in England and the colonies, and second on the
necessary role the press must play in democracy—that of informing the
84
public of government action.
In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Burger outlined a brief
yet thorough overview of the history of criminal trials in England, the
85
colonies, and the American republic. “[T]he historical evidence
demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been
86
presumptively open.” In addition to the historical record, the Chief Justice
discussed the justifications for holding public criminal trials:
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread
acknowledgement, long before there were behavioral scientists, that
public trials had significant community therapeutic value. . . . [P]eople
sensed from experience and observation that, especially in the
administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice
must have the support derived from public acceptance of both the
87
process and its results.

After proceeding through the historical record of criminal trials, the
Court turned to the First Amendment, rather than the right to a public trial
88
in the Sixth Amendment, to defend its holding. “Free speech carries with
it some freedom to listen. . . . What this means in the context of trials is that
the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
89
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors . . . .”

B.

Access to Prisons

While Richmond Newspapers grants the public and press a right of
access to court proceedings, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
Id. at 564-69.
Id. at 569-71.
Id. at 564-73.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 575-77.
Id. at 576.
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press has no right of access beyond that of the general public. In the
companion cases of Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
the Court rejected the press’ argument that the right to gather information
91
guaranteed a right to interview prison inmates. Both the state of California
and the federal government prohibited the press from requesting and
conducting interviews with specific inmates. After determining that the
First Amendment speech rights of the inmates did not apply, the Court held
that “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
92
inmates beyond that afforded the general public.”
There are two important and interrelated factors in the Court’s
reasoning which bear on the present debate: First, these holdings depend on
the presumption that the restricted access was not motivated by a desire to
limit the public’s information on the subject or to intentionally frustrate the
media’s newsgathering attempts. Second, the restrictions at issue were
unrelated to the content of the information that was prohibited.
In the majority opinion in Pell, Justice Stewart began his discussion
of the media’s right to access specific inmates by evaluating the state’s
motivation for the prohibition: “We note at the outset that this regulation is
not part of an attempt by the State to conceal the conditions in its prisons or
93
to frustrate the press’ investigation and reporting of those conditions.”
The regulation at issue did not deny the press access to the prison, or even
94
to inmates. Journalists were allowed to visit prisons, speak to any inmate
encountered during the visit, conduct confidential interviews with inmates
at random, and if reporters were seeking information about a specific
prison program, they could observe group meetings and interview
95
participants. Members of the media were simply prohibited from
96
requesting interviews with specific inmates. The state was not limiting the
access of the media, and by proxy, of the public to information regarding
prisons and the imposition of penal punishment. It was simply prohibiting
specific contact with individuals.

90. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974); accord Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
91. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
92. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834.
93. Id. at 830. See also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 851 (“The ban against press interviews is not
part of any general news blackout in the federal prisons.”).
94. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 831 (“The sole limitation on newsgathering in California prisons is the
prohibition in § 415.071 of interviews with individual inmates specifically designated by
representatives of the press.”).
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More importantly, this restriction was in no manner motivated by a
desire to suppress the content of these interviews. The regulation was
adopted in response to violent episodes in the prison, which authorities
97
partially attributed to press-requested interviews. The “notoriety” that
certain inmates received from members of the press encouraged disregard
for prison rules by the inmates, and ultimately contributed to the deaths of
98
two inmates and a prison guard.
These two distinctions are very important for the present analysis.
The fundamental conclusion reached by the Court (that the press has no
right of access beyond that of the general public) was premised on the
specific fact that the government was restricting access for purely neutral
reasons, and restricting access in a way that did not infringe on the ability
of the press to observe and report on the administration of the public
function of penal justice. Content-neutrality is a prerequisite to the Court’s
access jurisprudence.

V. THE MODERN CHALLENGE TO PRIVATE EXECUTION LAWS:
THE RIGHT TO BROADCAST
The most common arguments made against private execution laws
today are arguments for broadcasting executions. The Fifth Circuit
announced the first major statement on the issue in 1977, overturning a
district court’s order to allow the public broadcast of Texas’s first
99
execution in a dozen years. Since the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, no court—
state or federal—has ever held that there is a constitutional right to film and
to broadcast executions. In Halquist v. Department of Corrections, the
Washington Supreme Court declined the same argument under its state
constitution; however, the court reached a factual distinction that no federal
court has ever drawn—that the televised format of an execution is a
100
content-based classification for First Amendment analysis. In a highly
publicized recent decision, a U.S. District Court in Indiana rejected an
Internet broadcaster’s attempt to televise the execution of Oklahoma City
101
bomber Timothy McVeigh. These cases are certainly not a complete
survey of the decisions on the issue, but they illustrate the important
arguments, and the reasons why these attempts inevitably have failed.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 831-32.
Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
783 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1989).
Entm’t Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
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Garrett v. Estelle

Following the reintroduction of the death penalty in Texas, a
television news reporter petitioned the state to record, and later broadcast,
102
the state’s first execution after the law was changed. His request was
denied, as state law prohibited the recording of executions by any
103
mechanical means. The District Court invalidated the law as repugnant to
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the state appealed to the
104
Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, citing extensively to Pell and Saxbe,
holding that “the protection which the first amendment provides to the
news gathering process does not extend to matters not accessible to the
105
public generally, such as filming of executions in Texas state prison.” In
order to support this holding, the court found that the filming of an
execution did not possess any quality that would classify it as “content”
106
under First Amendment analysis. The court stated that nothing in the
107
record or through logical inference justified the content-based argument.
The court reasoned: “Despite the unavailability of film of the actual
execution the public can be fully informed; the free flow of ideas and
108
information need not be inhibited.” Having disposed of the media’s
content-based claim, the Fifth Circuit overturned the District Court’s
109
decision as directly analogous to the prison access cases.

B.

Halquist v. Department of Corrections

In 1989, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed a challenge
110
identical to that faced by the Garrett court. Halquist, a documentary
filmmaker seeking to film an execution, argued for a constitutional right to
do so. He, however, based his argument under the state constitution rather
111
than the First Amendment to the federal constitution. He premised his
argument on two separate grounds: first, that the citizens of Washington

102. Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Texas 1977), rev’d 556 F.2d 1274 (5th
Cir. 1977).
103. Id.
104. Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1277.
105. Id. at 1276.
106. Id. at 1278.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1280.
110. Halquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 783 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1989).
111. Id. at 1065.
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had a constitutional right to attend executions; and second, that a journalist
112
permitted by the state to witness an execution has a right to videotape it.
The Washington high court dismissed both arguments. Initially, it
determined that under state constitutional interpretation, the public had no
113
right to attend the execution. Halquist argued for this right under the
114
state’s guarantee of retained rights by the people, not under the state
115
constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of speech. The court found
116
no such retained rights in the state’s constitutional jurisprudence.
Next, the court evaluated the restriction on speech under the express
guarantee of free speech in the state constitution. The court held that the
prohibition against the filming of an execution was inherently a content117
based classification of speech. “[C]ommon experience suggests that a
videotape of an execution is information that is qualitatively different from
a mere verbal report. . . . [A] taping ban is a limitation on access to
118
substantive information, not a limitation on dissemination.” The court
ultimately found this fact to be insufficient grounds on which to grant
119
Halquist’s request. The court viewed the restriction as a limitation on
access, and since the public did not have a right to observe the execution,
the state could foreclose access, citing directly to Garrett, Pell,
120
and Saxbe.
The Washington court’s analysis, although certainly an authoritative
judgment under the state constitution, cannot be reconciled with First
Amendment analysis in the federal courts. Pell and Saxbe require that
restrictions on access must be content-neutral. Once the state enacts laws to
restrict the dissemination of information on the basis of its content, Pell and
Saxbe cannot control. If a federal court were ever to adopt the central
factual finding of the Halquist court, the case could not be evaluated under
Pell, Saxbe, or Garrett.

112. Id. at 1066.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 30 (“The enumeration in this Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny others retained by the people.”)).
115. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”).
116. Halquist, 783 P.2d at 1066.
117. Id. at 1067.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1067-68.
120. Id. at 1067.
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C. Entertainment Network, Inc. v. Lappin: The Execution of
Timothy McVeigh
Federal regulations prohibit the “visual or audio recording” of a
121
federal execution. Seeking to televise the execution of Oklahoma City
bomber Timothy McVeigh, Internet broadcaster Entertainment Network,
Inc. (“ENI”) brought an action in the District Court for the Southern
122
District of Indiana to challenge the constitutionality of the regulation.
The court rejected ENI’s argument, accepting both of the key holdings
from Garrett, that the regulation was content-neutral, and that the public
123
had no right of access.
The decision was premised on the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Garrett
that video images of an execution contain no content beyond the written
124
word. The court reasoned, relying directly on Garrett, that “the free flow
125
of ideas and information” was uninhibited. However, the ENI court
recognized the two distinct elements to content-neutral analysis under the
First Amendment: (1) that the restriction must not make reference to the
content; and (2) that the restriction serves purposes unrelated to the
126
content. Dismissing both requirements, the court pointed directly to
Garrett and held that the visual depiction of the execution did not possess
127
“content” as defined under the First Amendment.
The ENI court held, in addition to the content analysis, that the federal
128
regulation was a valid “‘time, place, and manner’ restriction.” Primarily,
the court relied upon the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
129
Kerley. In Kerley, restrictions against filming trial proceedings in federal
130
courtrooms were upheld. The District Court in ENI determined that
restrictions against the use of cameras in courtrooms, “which by tradition
are perhaps the most open public places in our society,” are directly
131
analogous to the use of cameras in the execution chamber.
After determining that the restriction was both a content-neutral ban
on speech and a valid time, place, and manner restriction, the court found
121. 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f) (2001).
122. Entm’t Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1014-15.
125. Id. at 1015.
126. Id. at 1014.
127. Id. at 1014-15.
128. Id. at 1015 (quoting United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d 111, 114 (2d
Cir. 1984).
129. Id. (citing United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985)).
130. Kerley, 753 F.2d at 621-22.
131. Entm’t Network, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
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that the prison access cases of Pell and Saxbe were controlling, and held
132
that the regulation was constitutional.

VI. A QUESTION OF CONTENT RATHER THAN ACCESS
Historical analysis is nothing new to the debate over televised
133
executions.
Several commentators have argued that the historical
tradition of capital punishment in England, in the colonies, and in the early
years of the republic necessitates that the public does have a right of access,
based on the holding of Richmond Newspapers. In Richmond Newspapers,
Chief Justice Burger stated:
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials
to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a
‘right of access’ . . . . The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to
publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much
meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be
134
foreclosed arbitrarily.

It is this very statement that drives most of the arguments for a “right
of access” to film executions. Commentators have argued that at the time
private execution laws were adopted, the public had an explicit, guaranteed
right of access to attend executions. This argument is persuasive, stating
that because the public could witness executions at the time of the adoption
135
of the First Amendment, there was a constitutional right to do so. When
the right was arbitrarily foreclosed, it was a blatant violation of the
Constitution, and remains so, even if it has been unchallenged for 160
years. This avoids the access problems of Pell and Saxbe because the
public has a right to view executions; therefore, the state may not prohibit
the media from acting as the public’s representative. This argument,
however, has repeatedly failed in the courts, and efforts to televise
executions ultimately have lost because the courts have characterized them
as access cases.
This Note does not attack the validity of the access argument, but
merely suggests a related alternative: by privatizing executions in the midnineteenth century, the state might or might not have interfered with an
136
implicit First Amendment right, but the state’s motivations certainly
violated the First Amendment as a content- and viewpoint-based restriction
132. Id. at 1010-1014.
133. See Bessler, supra note 71.
134. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1980).
135. See infra Section I.
136. Id. at 580. Burger stated, “We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit
in the guarantees of the First Amendment . . . .” Id. This was based on the strong historical
tradition of openness that was present at the adoption of the First Amendment. Id. at 569.
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on speech. The proper emphasis should not be on the historical tradition of
openness, but rather on the reasons why public executions were ceased in
this country. The systematic and direct effort to shield the public from the
imposition of capital punishment necessitates that the courts evaluate these
questions not as access cases, but as content- and viewpoint-based
restrictions on speech. In other words, much like the “access” argument,
the public has a right to witness executions; however, this right is not a
derivative of the historical tradition of openness, but upon the content and
viewpoint justifications for enacting private execution laws.
The primary factor in content-neutral analysis is whether the
restriction on speech is based upon a disagreement with the content of the
137
message. Government regulation of speech, however, is content neutral
138
where it is justified without reference to the content. In both Garrett and
ENI, the courts unequivocally stated that there was no inherent “content” at
issue in the recorded visual images that were not available in the reporter’s
139
description of events. In the abstract, this argument is constitutionally
permissible; the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that visual
140
images contain a content quality beyond the printed account of events.
In order to make the core First Amendment argument, one must get
around the central holding of Garrett regarding content-neutrality. Both
Garrett and ENI explicitly held, relying upon the same language, that a
prohibition against a televised execution fails to make a content distinction
141
on speech:
[A]ccess is provided except for one purpose, to film executions. In
order to sustain Garrett’s argument we would have to find that the
moving picture of the actual execution possessed some quality giving
it “content” beyond, for example, that possessed by a simulation of the
execution. We discern no such quality from the record or from our
inferences therein. Despite the unavailability of film of the actual
execution the public can be fully informed; the free flow of ideas and
142
information need not be inhibited.

There are two responses to this holding: first is an empirical response
that it is, in fact, a false assertion in the context of the death penalty. The
second response is that the viewpoint nature of the regulation necessitates
the harshest of constitutional inquiries.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Id.
Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1278; accord ENI, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15.
See Bessler, supra note 71, at 400-02.
Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1278; accord ENI, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15.
Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1278.
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First, in the private execution context, the historical evidence strongly
suggests that the purposes served by private execution laws are directly
143
related to the content of a visual and live execution. This historical record
was acknowledged by Justice Marshall in death penalty analysis under the
144
Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, although not dispositive of the matter,
the evidence of this malicious intent to shield a political message should be
a major factor in any court’s content-neutral analysis of a private execution
regulation:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content. . . . Any restriction on expressive activity
because of its content would completely undercut the “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
145
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”

The principal inquiry on challenges to private execution laws should
not be whether the public has a right of access because of the historical
tradition of openness, but whether the public has a right of access because
the state has made a regulation that suppresses speech, at least in part,
because of disagreement with the message. The mere fact that there is the
potential for making such a determination indicates that, inherently, there
must be sufficient content in the prohibited message to trigger strict
146
scrutiny. Although this Note posits that the justification for the first
private execution was in fact to shield the public from the imposition of the
death penalty, the mere fact that it is possible to make such a determination
in the context of the execution chamber indicates that there must be some
form of “content” to the live viewing of an execution. The tradition of
capital punishment laws in this country, and the evidence of their effect—
suppressing public debate on an issue of national importance—demonstrate
143. See discussion infra Part III.
144. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 333-42 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
145. Chicago Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (quoting N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
146. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 (S.D. Ind.
2000). In holding that certain video games contain sufficient “content” for First Amendment
analysis, the court stated:
As a further indication that at least some video games contain protected forms of
expression, it would be theoretically possible for a law to engage in “viewpoint
discrimination” in regulating video games. One can imagine a law requiring that,
in games involving conflict and/or combat of some type, the player not be
associated with forces of evil, darkness, or authoritarianism. . . . The fact that it is
possible even to consider a “viewpoint” of “good guys” and “bad guys” in these
games is a significant indication that there are at least some aspects of plot and
character that may be entitled to at least some degree of First Amendment
protection.
Id.
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that characterizing these restrictions as content-neutral is incompatible with
the Supreme Court’s opinions on neutral legislation.
More importantly, these regulations go beyond mere implication of
the content of an execution—the regulations restricting live reproductions
of executions are a viewpoint distinction on a political issue. The Supreme
Court shows strong hostility toward legislation that discriminates against
speech on the basis of its content, but the Court is even more resistant to
147
speech that takes a particular viewpoint on a political issue: “The point of
the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in
148
some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.” The
historical evidence on private execution laws indicates clearly that the
states were not just barring the public from the gallows to prevent them
from seeing executions, but the states were doing so because it reinforced a
political viewpoint on the use of capital punishment. This evidence must be
a factor in analyzing the content neutrality of private execution laws.
Ultimately, the public has a right to see executions because the state
prohibits the visual images from reaching the public at least partially due to
disagreement with the message. “The rationale of the general prohibition
[against content-based classifications of speech], after all, is that content
discrimination ‘raises the specter that the government may effectively drive
149
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” The prohibition
against the visual broadcast of an execution rises far above Justice Scalia’s
“specter” of fear; the historical evidence suggests affirmatively that these
restrictions have, in fact, partially accomplished the goal of driving a
political viewpoint from the promised marketplace of the First
Amendment.
This analysis does not continue to the logical end: strict scrutiny
review of private execution laws. There are arguments to be made that the
state might have an interest in suppressing the speech based upon strictly
“neutral” justifications such as prison security and an inmate’s privacy
150
right. There is an argument that the historical justifications for silencing
speech are overshadowed in today’s world by compelling justifications,
fashioned in the most restrictive manner possible. The ultimate conclusion
147. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
148. Id. at 392.
149. Id. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
150. See Jerome T. Tao, Note, First Amendment Analysis of State Regulations
Prohibiting the Filming of Prisoner Executions, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1042 (1992), for an
analysis of arguments used to support private execution laws as “neutral” restrictions on
speech. See also Entm’t Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1017 (S.D. Ind.
2001).
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reached by this Note is not that there is a constitutional right to film
executions, but that where the state seeks to prohibit televised executions, it
must make and defend its arguments before the Supreme Court’s highest
constitutional hurdle—strict scrutiny review of a content- and viewpointbased restriction on speech.

VII. CONCLUSION
The history of capital punishment in this country is a long and divided
account of support and strong public outcry. The trends in public opinion
are certainly not linear, shifting in both directions at several points in our
history. Much of the history of the death penalty is unclear, even to the
most dedicated scholars on the subject. However, this point is obvious: in
the 1830s and 1840s there was a strong, grass-roots movement pushing for
the abolition of capital punishment. The states enacted “private” execution
laws, and there is evidence to suggest that these laws were enacted for the
express purpose of limiting the public’s access to the brutality of the death
penalty. Following the enactment of these laws, opposition to capital
punishment dropped, and the death penalty remains a part of the American
criminal justice system 160 years later.
Courts have unanimously denied the media’s requests to film and
televise executions. The cases have been summarily classified as “access”
cases under the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in Pell and Saxbe. Because
the media has no general constitutional right of access beyond that of the
general public, private execution laws have been upheld. The historical
evidence suggests, however, that these are not access cases. The restrictions
on filming executions are neither content- nor viewpoint-neutral. For this
reason, the public maintains a right to see an execution because the state
may not prohibit public debate by suppressing a particular side or
viewpoint on an issue. If the language of the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence means anything, it holds that the state may not
take a position on an issue of public concern through the suppression
of speech.

